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Abstract 
 
1. Objectives/Scope: 
This paper presents the methods by which NASA has designed, built, tested, and certified pyrotechnic 
devices for high reliability operation in extreme environments and illustrates the potential applications in the oil 
and gas industry. 
 
2. Methods, Procedures, Process  
NASA’s extremely successful application of pyrotechnics is built upon documented procedures and test 
methods that have been maintained and developed since the Apollo Program.  Standards are managed and 
rigorously enforced for performance margins, redundancy, lot sampling, and personnel safety.  The 
pyrotechnics utilized in spacecraft include such devices as small initiators and detonators with the power of a 
shotgun shell, detonating cord systems for explosive energy transfer across many feet, precision linear 
shaped charges for breaking structural membranes, and booster charges to actuate valves and pistons. 
 
3. Results, Observations, Conclusions  
NASA’s pyrotechnics program is one of the more successful in the history of Human Spaceflight.  No 
pyrotechnic device developed in accordance with NASA’s Human Spaceflight standards has ever failed in 
flight use.  NASA’s pyrotechnic initiators work reliably in temperatures as low as -420 oF.  Each of the 135 
Space Shuttle flights fired 102 of these initiators, some setting off multiple pyrotechnic devices, with never a 
failure.  The recent landing on Mars of the Opportunity rover fired 174 of NASA’s pyrotechnic initiators to 
complete the famous “7 minutes of terror.”  Even after traveling through extreme radiation and thermal 
environments on the way to Mars, every one of them worked.  These initiators have fired on the surface of 
Titan.   
 
4. Novel/Additive Information  
NASA’s design controls, procedures, and processes produce the most reliable pyrotechnics in the world.  
Application of pyrotechnics designed and procured in this manner could enable the energy industry’s 
emergency equipment, such as shutoff valves and deepsea blowout preventers, to be left in place for years in 
extreme environments and still be relied upon to function when needed, thus greatly enhancing safety and 
operational availability. 
 
Introduction 
NASA has directly provided pyrotechnic devices for all human-rated spaceflight programs from the Apollo effort 
forward.  The pyrotechnics utilized in spacecraft include such devices as small initiators and detonators, 
detonating cord systems for explosive energy transfer across many feet, precision linear shaped charges for 
breaking structural membranes, and booster charges to actuate valves and pistons.  The majority of these 
devices have been installed for highly critical applications where a failure to function, or premature function, would 
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result in mission loss and, potentially, loss of human life.  Over the course of the previous five decades, NASA 
has developed a protocol for designing, manufacturing, testing, qualifying, and accepting these critical 
components to ensure the best possible chance for mission success.  These methods were established because 
there were no military or industry standards then available to meet the stringent needs of human-rated spaceflight 
in extreme operational environments.  The information is captured as NASA standards, is comprised of best 
engineering practices and lessons learned, and also serves as the only accepted requirements documentation 
suitable for applications where human lives are at stake.  To date there have been zero flight failures of NASA 
pyrotechnic hardware.  This paper will present a brief synopsis of the methods NASA employs to take a design 
concept from inception to final acceptance with confidence in its ultimate reliability. 
 
Design Philosophy 
Every successful design must start with a well-established set of requirements.  These requirements must cover 
reliability, safety, and quality assurance measures, as well as performance.  Other critical parameters are 
configuration control, device traceability, material selection and control, considerations of service life, and a 
thorough understanding of the expected operational environment.  Finally, a robust suite of non-destructive and 
destructive verification tests is needed to fully vet the design. 
 
Redundancy is the fundamental means of mitigating single point failures when designing against the fails-to-
operate failure mode for must-work applications.  This includes redundancy down to, and including, the final 
explosive charge.  This design requirement is paramount, and compliance must be verified by test. 
 
Configuration Control & Traceability 
Highly disciplined configuration control is at the heart of the NASA pyrotechnics process.  Any documentation 
used in the manufacturing and testing of pyrotechnic hardware is captured in a configuration control baseline 
before the start of fabrication.  This includes all component and tooling drawings, component inspection and 
acceptance sheets, and manufacturing and testing paperwork.  These documents are recorded by number and 
revision.  An example is shown in Appendix A.  The use of alternate or redlined paperwork is strictly forbidden. 
 
The NASA production process is broken down into a series of Phase Reviews that must be conducted by NASA’s 
experienced pyrotechnic engineers and completed prior to acceptance of any lot of pyrotechnics.  These Reviews 
are generally held at the vendor’s facility and include participation of the vendor Engineering and Quality 
personnel, as well as of NASA Engineering and Quality representatives. 
 
A Phase I Review specifically focuses on component drawings.  Phase I is concluded by completing all action 
items generated during the Review.  At that point, the design configuration is locked down with required drawings, 
inspection sheets, and the document revision levels.  This allows the vendors to start procuring device 
components that may have long lead times. 
 
A Phase II Review establishes configuration of the remaining documentation, such as assembly and test 
procedures.  Again, this paperwork is locked down by document number and revision.  Phase II is complete when 
all Review action items are closed.  Completion of this Phase enables the vendor to start the manufacturing 
process and to proceed through final testing. 
 
The last stage, a Phase III Review, occurs when all manufacturing steps and all testing has been successfully 
completed.  These Reviews are always conducted at the vendor facility.  The product acceptance data packs 
(ADPs) are reviewed at this time and are evaluated for compliance, completeness, and accuracy.  The ADP 
consists of all component receiving inspection data, manufacturing and testing information, and discrepancy 
reports.  Visual inspection of the deliverable units is also performed.  The Phase III Review concludes when all 
action items and discrepancies are resolved.  A Flight Certificate, refer to Appendix F for an example, is then 
generated which provides lot pertinent information, such as part number and name, lot number, serial numbers, 
energetic material batch numbers, and an expiration date for age-sensitive devices.  NASA then takes official 
ownership and deems the hardware as flightworthy. 
 
Traceability is also enforced during the manufacturing and test process to ensure that all units fabricated during a 
production run are identical.  This traceability requires part marking with both lot and serial numbers.  This aids in 
segregating hardware built at different times and also helps to separate units within each lot.  Traceability 
requirements are also flowed down to the component level.  NASA employs single lot control for all parts 
determined to be critical.  This includes both structural and energetic materials.  For human spaceflight, the 
Johnson Space Center (JSC) takes that requirement a step further by establishing single lot control for all 
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pyrotechnic devices (i.e. each component must also come from single lots).  This greatly simplifies component 
tracking, eliminates device variability, and also serves to facilitate investigation efforts when anomalies occur.  
Component traceability requires that certificates of conformance (C of C) be provided for all parts and that 
manufacturing dates be provided for age sensitive materials.  The documentation must show compliance to all 
drawing requirements with a C of C for each operation conducted by sub-vendors.  Refer to Appendices B & C for 
C of C examples. 
 
Material selection is driven by the end function performance requirements.  Issues of structural integrity, age 
sensitivity, compatibility, operational environment, and energy output must be considered.  Only designated, well-
understood secondary explosives are to be used, and the use of vendor-proprietary blends is highly discouraged.  
Periodic surveillance sampling is also mandated for energetic materials in order to verify that the output 
characteristics have not degraded prior to loading.  NASA’s pyrotechnic discipline experts must evaluate and 
approve any deviations from the established material requirements. 
 
Development, Qualification, & Acceptance 
As mentioned above, a robust verification process is needed to show compliance with the design requirements.  
Thorough development testing is required prior to a device entering the qualification cycle.  These tests are used 
to determine that the design is acceptable for the intended function, and that success will be maintained with both 
positive, and negative, margins on the pyrotechnic device.  The positive margin tests are conducted to show that 
structural integrity is sustained when there is excessive explosive output.  The negative margin tests are used to 
show that function is not compromised if the explosive material degrades over time.  These tests also factor in the 
effects of other “unknown unknowns”. 
 
Qualification testing can begin once the development testing is completed and the operational margins are 
determined to be sufficient.  Full Quality Assurance oversight is used during the manufacturing and testing of the 
the qualification lot.  All anomalies are fully documented.  Any disposition other than scrap for a defective unit 
must be accepted through the established quality system and must have NASA expert concurrence.  The 
quantities tested must represent a sample size that is statistically significant and can meet the predetermined 
values for reliability and confidence.  The qualifying environmental conditions are established to provide 
significant margin over those predicted when in actual use.  A failure experienced during a non-destructive test 
results in loss of that unit, which may be replaced with another representative part.  However, a single failure 
during a destructive test can lead to rejection of the entire lot. 
 
Once a design has been fully qualified, subsequent lot builds go through a series of acceptance tests.  Quality 
Assurance oversight is the same as used during the qualification effort.  NASA mandates that the number of units 
expended during this process be 10% of the manufactured quantity, or 10 units, whichever is greater.  The 
acceptance tests may expose the units to environments that are less harsh than those assessed during 
qualification.  Any failure during destructive acceptance testing may also lead to a lot rejection.  Refer to Appendix 
D. 
 
Age Surveillance 
Age surveillance is maintained for all pyrotechnic hardware containing energetic material.  A small number of 
units are tested at predetermined intervals to extend the expiration date of the hardware lot.  This periodic 
inspection determines whether or not performance has degraded over time. 
 
Conclusion 
NASA’s pyrotechnics program is one of the more successful in the history of Human Spaceflight.  For example, 
the pyrotechnic initiators NASA provide work reliably in temperatures as low as -420 oF.  Each of the 135 Space 
Shuttle flights fired 102 of these initiators, some setting off multiple pyrotechnic devices, with no device failures.  
During its recent landing on Mars, the Opportunity rover fired 152 of these pyrotechnic initiators to complete the 
famous “7 minutes of terror.”  Even after traveling through extreme radiation and thermal environments on the 
way to Mars, every one of them worked.  These initiators have even fired on the surface of Titan.   
 
The NASA hardware design and acceptance process is extremely thorough when practiced in its entirety.  
Manufacturing hardware for Human Spaceflight results in a substantial amount of documentation produced and 
test data collected, and is a process that requires a significant amount of manpower for reviews.  This investment, 
however, has paid huge dividends considering the flawless flight record of pyrotechnic hardware built according to 
these standards.  This equates to tens of thousands of units successfully fired.  The upfront investment of this 
review process is low when compared to the loss of a mission, or worse yet, a human life.  
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Appendix A:  Example of Configuration Baseline Document 
 
  
LTR ZONE REVISION
D Revised Table with updated revision 
letters.
NEXT ASSEMBLY SIGNATURES DATE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
N/A DR  M. W. Maples 04/11/2013 LYNDON B. JOHNSON SPACE CENTER        HOUSTON,  TEXAS
ENG  M.W. Maples 04/11/2013
CH  T. Rohloff 04/11/2013 PRODUCT BASELINE RECORD,
1.375 FRANGIBLE NUT AND BOOSTERDRAWING TYPE APP 
Non-Flight Other QE 
MATL PROJECT   02241
STRESS CAGE CODE SIZE DWG NO. REV.
AUTH 21356 A SKH26152333
SCALE       NA ORG.     EP2 SHEET  1 OF 3FINAL APP
M. MAPLES
D
04/11/13
4/11/13
STATUS: Check for DCNs against the drawing.
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DWG NO.
SKH26152333
CAGE CODE
21356
SHEET  2 OF 3 .REV
PRODUCT BASELINE RECORD
1.375 FRANGIBLE NUT AND BOOSTER
PTRS JSC 66437 Revision B
PMP JSC 66479 Revision A
CDR & Phase II Review 
Description Part Number Lot Number
Frangible Nut SEH26152322-301 DDB/ DDC
Booster SEH26152324-301 DDE
Item Document Dash Rev. Description Comments
Assembly Piece Parts
1 SDH26152321 -003 E Frangible Nut, 1.375 Inch Released
2 SEH26152322 -301 A EFT-1 Frangible Nut, 1.375 Inch Released
3 SEH26152324 -301 NC Booster Assembly, EFT-1 Frangible Released
4 SEH26152101 -303 D Booster Assembly, Frangible Nut Released
5 SDH26152109 -006 F Booster Housing, Frangible Nut Released
6 SDH26152117 -001 A
Closure Disk, Booster, 1.5 Inch Frangible 
Nut
Released
7 SDH26152117 -002 A
Closure Disk, Booster, 1.5 Inch Frangible 
Nut
Released
8 SDH26152119 -001 A
Isomica Disk, Booster 1.5 Inch Frangible 
Nut
Released
9 SDH26152120 -001 A
PTFE Plug, Booster 1.5 Inch Frangible 
Nut
Released
Energy Systems Test Area (Standard) Operating Checklists
1 ESTA-OC-2-031 F
Helium Leak Check for Explosive 
Components
Active
2 ESTA-OC-2-080 A
Pyrotechnic Resistance Welder Operating 
Procedure
Active
3 ESTA-OC-2-083 A
Operating Checklist for Pneumatic Press 
System 213
Active
4 ESTA-OC-2-085 C Operating Checklist for Propellant Drying Active
5 ESTA-OC-2-101 NC
Procedure for Operation of Low Pressure 
Panel, System 944
Active
6 ESTA-OC-2-106 A Telesis Laser Marker Operating Checklist Active
7 ESTA-OC-2-107 NEW
Operation of Vacuum Bell Jar, System 
204
Active
8 ESTA-OC-2-218 A
Operation of Cincinnati Sub-Zero with 
LN2 Boost, System 218
Active
9 ESTA-OC-352-01200 NC
Operation of 1 Cubic Foot Cincinnati Sub-
Zero with Humidity Control
Active
10 ESTA-OC-352-01807 NC Shock Tube Detonator Initiation Active
11 ESTA-OP-2-104 A
Operating Procedure for Hydraulic 
Loading and Firing Fixture
Active
Procedures
1 SKG26152325 C
Acceptance Test Procedure, 1.375 Inch 
Frangible Nut and Booster Assembly
Released
D
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Appendix A (Cont) 
 
  
DWG NO.
SKH26152333
CAGE CODE
21356
SHEET  3 OF 3 .REV
2 SKG26152326 B
Assembly Procedure, Booster Assembly, 
1.375 Inch Nut 
Released
3 SKG26152327 D
Frangible Nut 1.375 Inch Receiving and 
Inspection Plan
Released
4 SKG26152328 B
Booster Housing, Frangible Nut Booster 
Assembly Receiving and Inspection Plan
Released
5 SKG26152329 NC
Isomica Disk, 1.5 Inch Frangible Nut 
Booster Receiving and Inspection Plan
Released
6 SKG26152330 NC
Closure Disk, 1.5 Inch Frangible Nut 
Booster, Receiving and Inspection Plan
Released
7 SKG26152331 NC RDX Receiving and Inspection Plan Released
8 SKG26152332 NC
PTFE Plug, Frangible Nut Booster 
Receiving and Inspection Plan
Released
Test Equipment and Tooling Drawings
1 SDH26152111 B Zero Load Bolt Released
2 SDH26152112 C Washer, 1.5 Frangible Nut Released
3 SEH26152113 D Load Bolt, Frangible Nut Released
4 SDH26152114 NC Base Plate, 1.5 Frangible Nut Released
5 Dwg# 352-015 A Hydraulic Loading Fixture Released
6 Dwg# 352-043 NC Hydraulic Test Stand, 2.5" Frangible Nut Released
7 Dwg# 352-048 E Vacuum Cup, Helium Leak Detector Released
8 Dwg# 352-101 A Weld Fixture 1.5 Inch Nut Booster Released
9 Dwg# 352-102
NC Electrode, Spot Welding 1.5 Inch Nut 
Booster
Released
10 Dwg# 352-103 NC Load Test Stand, 1.5” Frangible Nut Released
11 Dwg# 352-105
NC Spherical Washer Set, Hydraulic Test 
Stand
Released
12 Dwg# 352-106 NC Loading Fixture, 1.5 Inch Nut Booster Released
13 Dwg# 352-108 NC Funnel, 1.5 Inch Frangible Nut Booster Released
14 Dwg# 352-109 NC
Ram Guide, 1.5 Inch Frangible Nut 
Booster
Released
15 Dwg# 352-110 NC
PTFE Plug Reaming Tool, 1.5 Inch 
Frangible Nut Booster
Released
16 Dwg# 352-113 NC Zero Load Test Fixture Released
17 Dwg# 352-117 NC Plug Guide, 1.5” Frangible Nut Booster Released
18 Dwg# 352-118 NC
Vibration Fixture 1.5 Inch Frangible Nut 
Booster
Released
19 Dwg# 352-122 NC Loading Ram, 1.5” Frangible Nut Booster Released
20 Dwg# 352-124 NC Swell Sleeve, 1.5 Frangible Nut Booster Released
21 Dwg# 352-178 A Washer, 1.375 Inch Frangible Nut Released
22 Dwg# 352-180 A Base Plate, 1.375 Frangible Nut Released
23 Dwg# 352-185 NC Tapered Washer Set, 1.375 Frangible Nut Released
24 Dwg# 352-186 NC Nut Spacer, 1.375 Inch Nut Released
25 Dwg# 352-187 NC Load Test Stand 1.5” Frangible Nut Released
26 Dwg# 352-188 A Box, Assembly Released
27 Dwg# 352-210 C 2-1/2" Nut Loading Fixture System 210 Released
28 Dwg# 352-212 NC Helium Leak Can System 212 Released
29 Dwg# 352-213 A Pneumatic Press System 213 Released
30 Dwg# 352-944 A Low Pressure Panel System 944 Released
D
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Appendix B:  Example of Component Receiveing Inspection Documentation 
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Appendix C:  Example of Component Process Certification Documentation 
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Appendix D:  Typical Destructive & Non-Destructive Acceptance Testing 
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Appendix E:  Serial Number Traceability 
 
  
Booster Assembly Serial Number Listing
P/N L/N S/N Description Status
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00001 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Available
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00002 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Available
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00003 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Available
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00004 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Available
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00005 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Available
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00006 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Available
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00007 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Delivered to Lockheed 
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00008 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut DLAT Unit
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00009 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Delivered to Lockheed 
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00010 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut DLAT Unit
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00011 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Delivered to Lockheed 
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00012 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Available
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00013 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut DLAT Unit
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00014 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut DLAT Unit
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00015 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Delivered to Lockheed 
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00016 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut DLAT Unit
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00017 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Delivered to Lockheed 
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00018 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut DLAT Unit
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00019 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut DLAT Unit
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00020 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Delivered to Lockheed 
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00021 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Available
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00022 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut DLAT Unit
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00023 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut DLAT Unit
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00024 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut DLAT Unit
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00025 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Available
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00026 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Available
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00027 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Delivered to Lockheed 
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00028 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Delivered to Lockheed 
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00029 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut DLAT Unit
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00030 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Available
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00031 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Available
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00032 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Available
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00033 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Available
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00034 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Available
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00035 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Available
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00036 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Available
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00037 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Available
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00038 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut DLAT Unit
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00039 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut DLAT Unit
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00040 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Delivered to Lockheed 
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00041 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut DLAT Unit
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00042 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Available
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00043 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut DLAT Unit
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00044 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Delivered to Lockheed 
SDH26152109-006 NNJ13HB83P 45 Booster Housing, Frangible Nut
Downgraded prior to 
assembly (PP1330041)
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Booster Assembly Serial Number Listing
P/N L/N S/N Description Status
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00046 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Delivered to Lockheed 
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00047 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Available
SDH26152109-006 NNJ13HB83P 48 Booster Housing, Frangible Nut
Downgraded prior to 
assembly (PP1330041)
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00049 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Delivered to Lockheed 
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00050 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut Available
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00051 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut DLAT Unit
SEH26152324-301 DDE 00052 Booster Asembly, EFT-1 Frangible Nut DLAT Unit
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Appendix F:  Sample Flight Certification 
 
 
 
 
